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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines European Union (EU)[1] agricultural policy toward Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) from 1990 to 1994 and asks whether its agricultural assistance through the Phare program was 
based more on principles of free trade or protectionism.  The answer might seem predictable given that 
EU agricultural policy since the 1958 Treaty of Rome has been managed by the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) which is explicitly based on protectionist principles: it uses production subsidies, export 
refunds, and import levies to stabilize prices and support farm incomes.  Three decades of agricultural 
productivity growth have eroded the need for such protection, but the CAP’s political roots are deeply 
embedded in the EU policy-making structure because this supranational policy symbolizes the EU’s 
ability to provide common solutions to Member State problems.  Therefore, the CAP has dubious 
economic merit, but its political significance is critical:  “...its continued existence, including a 
supranational character, is vital to the credibility of the EC as a political entity.”[2]  This political 
entrenchment has prevented significant reform of the CAP, much to the detriment of consumers and 
small farmers. In the 1980s, though, EU policy-makers started to question the role of the CAP after 
food surpluses and budgetary increases reached crisis proportions.  They approved the most extensive 
CAP reform in the 1992 MacSharry plan, but this measure proved timid after inter-governmental 
bargaining in the Council of Ministers weakened its effect.[3]  Overall, then, the EU has only 
cautiously moved toward a more free trade agricultural policy that minimizes government 
interventionism and maximizes market forces. 
However, there has arisen a competing source of EU agricultural policy within the Phare program.  
Phare was created in December 1989 to deliver technical assistance to the CEE during the post-
communist transition.  It has funded government reforms across a wide range of sectors—such as 
energy, banking, education, and agriculture—in order to soften the pain of social change and build 
market economies based on free enterprise and private initiative.[4]  This paper focuses on Phare 
assistance to the agricultural sector, which is perhaps the most significant because the EU has signed 
Europe Agreements with eleven CEE countries which promise enlargement.  Yet, the biggest obstacle 
to CEE membership in the EU will be agriculture because the budgetary effects of extending CAP 
subsidies to the CEE could prove explosive.  The CEE has a large agricultural sector with millions of 
farmers who qualify for CAP production subsidies and export refunds, and these farmers produce in 
abundance those commodities that receive the highest levels of CAP support—cereals, meat, and dairy 
products.  Moreover, the EU has achieved self-sufficiency in these food groups, so the EU would have 
to subsidize exports of these surplus commodities into new markets.  Therefore, EU enlargement will 
likely involve a trade-off:  either the EU reduces its CAP subsidies in order to make eastward 
expansion affordable, a prospect that is opposed by powerful EU agricultural lobbying groups, or it 
admits the CEE without CAP reform and readjusts its finances to meet the vastly increased costs.  
Phare has played a key role in this enlargement issue by revitalizing CEE agriculture and thereby 
influencing the terms of this eventual trade-off. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The objective of this paper is to test two hypotheses.  The first one asserts that Phare agricultural 
assistance to the CEE from 1990 to 1994 was based on principles of free trade.  If proved true, this 
empirical finding would contradict the seemingly logical expectation that Phare would imitate the CAP, 
the dominant EU agricultural policy, and adopt protectionist principles.  In that case, Phare would 
likely advise the CEE governments to restrict production at levels that assure self-sufficiency but do 
not generate export competition with the EU and maintain prices at levels which are reasonable to 
consumers but do not undercut EU producers. Such an agricultural system would place less budgetary 
strain on the CAP during the process of EU enlargement.  Yet, this hypothesis asserts that Phare 
adopted a free trade policy and encouraged efficient, export-oriented growth in CEE agriculture which 
will increase CEE output, drive down world food prices, and raise the cost of CAP price supports.  
Phare has thus widened the gulf between the EU and CEE agricultural systems. 
The second hypothesis asserts that Phare’s choice of free trade agricultural policy is best explained by 
policy network theory.  In 1989, the CEE transition required the EU to formulate a response that would 
assist these countries toward democracy and a free market economy.  This decision involved creating a 
new policy network centered around the Phare program in the Commission’s Directorate-General for 
External Economic Relations (DG-I), a different outcome from previous situations in which the EU 
had responded to external reform pressures like the GATT Uruguay Round by utilizing existing 
agricultural policy networks in the Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG-VI).  Moreover, the Phare 
policy network became distinct from the CAP policy network by not establishing ties with EU 
agricultural lobbying groups which defend the CAP’s protectionist orientation.  The gap between these 
two policy networks thus explains how Phare formulated an agricultural policy based on principles of 
free trade rather than protectionism—a finding which confirms policy network theory as a useful tool 
for explaining the methods and contradictions of EU policy-making. 
 
Policy Network Theory 
  
Policy network theory falls between corporatism and pluralism as an analytical tool.  It focuses on 
interactions between clusters of policy-making actors who depend upon and exchange a common set of 
resources in order to achieve compromise policy outcomes.[5]  The members possess mutual needs, 
expectations, and experiences and share a “community view” on their issue-area.[6]  The strength of 
policy network theory, then, is its ability to model policy-making in detail which allows “a more fine 
grain analysis than the rather broad stroke ‘national policy styles’ approach and other models which 
take the state as the basic unit of analysis.”[7]  Although developed in case-studies of national 
government behavior, policy network theory has recently been elevated to the EU-level where similar 
policy processes occur:  “As in all modern polities, EC ‘politics’ is dominated by questions of 
representation and participation, the distribution and allocation of resources, and political and 
administrative efficiency.”[8]  The EU, in fact, is rife with policy networks for three reasons:  first, 
there are innumerable linkages between an array of meso-level actors who represent a wide range of 
interests—public and private, national and transnational;  second, political oversight of the meso-level 
by Member States is weak and fragmented, so bargaining is less constrained; and third, meso-level 
decisions shape policy outcomes more strongly than in national governments because lobbying 
becomes more difficult after proposals leave the Commission.[9] 
However, neofunctionalism has long dominated studies of EU agricultural policy.  This theory focuses 
on state interactions at the systemic-level and shows that integration occurs when elite actors cooperate 
in one technical sector and expands by a process of spill-over into other sectors of mutual interest.  It 
argues that the CAP appeared in the 1958 Treaty of Rome because the original six Member States 
shared a common aim to raise rural living standards, and although they wrangled over issues like 
pricing during the negotiations, they eventually produced a CAP that endowed the Commission with 
broader administrative responsibilities: 
 
“Such a pattern of converging interests has uniformly given rise to further demands for action, thereby 
enhancing the role of the central institutions and contributing to the process of integration.”[10] 
 
Yet, neofunctionalist theory cannot answer the following question:  after spill-over has occurred and 
the CAP has been formalized by bureaucratic procedures, what forces can cause a shift in policy?  This 
question moves beyond integration and into the realm of daily politics where neofunctionalism loses its 
relevance because it explains the larger processes of integration and institution-building but does not 
have enough analytical depth to analyze routine processes of EU policy-making.  Policy network 
theory closes this gap by modeling the behavior of non-elite, technocratic actors in periods of routine 
decision-making.  Whereas neofunctionalism provides an appropriate theory for studying the CAP 
because that process was systemic-level and history-making, policy network theory provides a better 
tool for explaining Phare because this process is meso-level and policy-implementing (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1:  Levels of Analysis in EU Policy-Making 
 
Policy Levels  Dominant Actors Bargaining Relevant Theory 
 
systemic-level  European Council political  neofunctionalism 
history-making  ECJ   legalistic inter-governmentalism 
 
macro-level  Council of Ministers political  new institutionalism 
policy-setting  COREPER  administrative 
 
meso-level  Commission  technocratic policy networks 
policy-implementing Committees  consensual 
 
Source: Peterson, John. “Policy Networks and Governance in the European Union:  The Case of 
Research and Development Policy” in Patrick Dunleavy and Jeffrey Stanyer, eds.  Contemporary 
Political Studies Volume 1  (Belfast: Political Studies Association, 1994)  p. 153.  Presented with 
modifications. 
 
Specifically, this paper tests the Rhodes model which arranges policy networks along a continuum 
from policy communities to issue networks (see Table 2).  Policy networks are located on this 
continuum according to three categories of variables—membership, interaction, and resources.  
Establishing a policy network’s position is critical because network structure has an impact on policy 
outcome: 
 
“...the existence of a policy network both has an influence on, although it clearly does not determine, 
policy outcomes and reflects the relative status, or even power, of the particular interests in a broad 
policy area.”[11] 
 
This paper, then, assesses the structure of the Phare policy network and contrasts it to the CAP policy 
network using the Rhodes model variables. 
 
Table 2:  Rhodes Model of Policy Networks  
 
-----------------------Poles----------------------- 
Network Characteristics  Membership Permeability 
 Policy Community   Small and closed 
 Issue Network    Large and open  
 
Continuity    Interaction Frequency 
 Stable     High and intense 
 Unstable   Low and irregular 
 
Relationships    Resources Distribution 
 Share values    More equitable 
 Regular conflict    Less equitable 
 
Outcomes 
 Positive-sum 
 Zero-sum 
 
Source:  Marsh, D., and R. A. W. Rhodes, “Policy Communities and Issue Networks:  Beyond 
Typology” in Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks in British Government  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1992)  p. 251.  Presented with modifications. 
 
This paper proceeds in three sections.  Section Two tests the hypothesis that Phare agricultural 
assistance from 1990 to 1994 was shaped more by principles of free trade than protectionism.  It 
analyzes completed projects—emergency assistance, land reform, enterprise development, and rural 
credit expansion—then looks at Phare’s planned future orientations—policy convergence, productivity 
enhancement, and export promotion.  Section Three tests the hypothesis that the gap between the CAP 
and Phare policy networks explains this shift in Phare policy outcome.  It assesses the structures of the 
two networks and relates their policies to two issues—the conflict between EU agricultural aid and 
trade objectives, and EU enlargement.  Section Four reflects on the relevance of this case-study to 
future EU-CEE agricultural relations and the refinement of policy network theory. 
 
2. PHARE AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
The agricultural sector constitutes a key component of the CEE transition because it is vital to macro-
economic stability and growth.  In 1990, agriculture accounted for a large share of CEE income and 
employment relative to the West because this sector’s post-war structural adjustment had been stunted 
by communist policy.  Yet, it showed potential for large gains in productivity, so through effective 
agricultural reforms, the CEE could quickly realize increases in output and possibly achieve a surplus 
food trade.  In addition, improvements in agriculture would positively influence public opinion 
because ample food supplies favorably reflect a government’s ability to deliver essential consumer 
goods.  The CEE governments could thus extend their window of opportunity for reform by satisfying 
consumer demand: 
 
Food production and its delivery to the customer, namely the public, is the most basic and fundamental 
aspect of any nation’s economy...It is by the success or failure of the agricultural and food reforms that, 
inevitably, the chances of success in the other sectors will be judged.  Public patience and the 
corresponding room for maneuver which the authorities enjoy in their reform plans overall are thus 
critically linked to agriculture and food.[12] 
 
Consequently, agricultural assistance became a cornerstone of the Phare program which was launched 
by the EU in December 1989.  Its mission was to advance quickly and rationally the CEE transition to 
democracy and a free market economy: 
 
The Phare program is a European Union initiative which supports the development of a larger 
democratic family of nations within a prosperous and stable Europe.  Its aim is to help the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe rejoin the mainstream of European development and build closer political 
and economic ties with the European Union.[13] 
 
Phare stressed the importance of agriculture and devoted a significant share of its total assistance to 
this sector.  From 1990 to 1993, it delivered ECU 3.33 billion in total grants to become the region’s 
largest grant donor, and agricultural assistance comprised 12 percent of this total for ECU 416 million 
(see Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Phare Assistance by Sector, 1990-1993 
(% of total assistance) 
 
Restructuring / Private Sector 17.0 Public Health   4.0 
Training / Education / R&D  12.7  Social / Labor   3.5 
Agriculture   12.0 Regional Development  3.0 
Environment / Nuclear Safety 9.6  Financial Sector  2.0 
Humanitarian / Food Aid 8.5  Civic Society / Democracy 0.6 
Infrastructure   8.0 Other    13.5 
Administrative Reform  5.6 
 
Source:  Phare Information Office.  “Assistance Programme”  (Brussels)  p. 3. 
 
The distribution of these agricultural grants evolved as the CEE transition spread from Central Europe 
to the Baltics and Balkans.  The number of countries receiving assistance climbed from three in 
1990—Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—to ten in 1993 (see Table 4).  Assistance levels varied 
according to each country’s size and need.  For example, Phare assistance to Poland dropped from 
ECU 100 million in 1990 to ECU 30 million in 1993, while assistance to Bulgaria fell from ECU 16 
million to zero over the same period.  Phare only had access to limited EU resources, so it sought to 
maximize its effect by continually adjusting its assistance according to local conditions. 
 
Table 4:  Phare Agricultural Assistance by Country, 1990-1993 
(ECU millions)  
  1990 1991 1992 1993 Total 
Poland  100.0 17.0 23.0 30.0 170.0 
Romania 0.0 39.0 32.0 5.0 76.0 
Hungary 20.0 13.0 5.0 30.5 68.5 
Bulgaria 16.0 25.0 10.0 0.0 51.0 
Albania  0.0 0.0 15.0 10.0 25.0 
Latvia  0.0 1.3 0.7 5.0 7.0 
Lithuania  0.0 1.5 0.6 5.0 7.1 
Estonia  0.0 3.2 0.4 1.2 4.8 
Slovakia 0.0  0.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
FYROM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 
Total  136.0 100.0 89.7 90.2 415.9 
 
Source:  Phare Information Office.  “Progress and Strategy Paper:  Agriculture”  (Brussels, June 1994)  
p. 19. 
 
Emergency Assistance 
 
In 1990, Phare devoted its largest share of agricultural assistance to emergency input supplies because 
the highest priority of CEE recipients was to maintain healthy levels of food consumption after their 
state-owned supply and distribution networks collapsed and production declined precipitously.  
Therefore, Phare delivered ECU 84.6 million worth of animal feed, fertilizers, crop protection 
chemicals, seed, replacement and spare machinery parts, and other basic agricultural inputs which 
amounted to 62 percent of its budget. 
 
Table 5:  Phare Agricultural Assistance by Type, 1990-1993 
(ECU millions)  
    1990 (%)  1993 (%) 1990-93 (%)  
    Total Share Total Share Total  Share 
Farm Input Supplies  84.6 62.2 0.0 0.0 131.1  31.5 
Initial Reform Strategies 1.8 1.3 5.3 5.9 21.6  5.2 
PMU and Aid Coordination 1.1 0.9 8.9 9.9 23.0  5.5 
Land Register, Policies, Laws 2.0 1.5 15.8 17.5 40.5  9.7 
Banks    3.7 2.7 14.3 15.9 29.5  7.1 
Rural Credit/Guarantee Funds 37.0 27.2 10.0 11.1 66.0  15.9 
Business/Extension Services 4.3 3.2 12.4 13.7 57.7  13.9 
Privatization/Restructuring 0.0 0.0 6.7 7.4 25.6  6.1 
Food Stds/Regional Programs 1.5 1.1 16.8 18.6 21.2  5.1 
 
Source:  Phare, “Progress and Strategy Paper”  p. 20. 
 
As conditions stabilized and the CEE started to recover its output, Phare’s input supply funding ended 
because it was intended as a stop-gap measure to enable the CEE to survive the most volatile period of 
transition without suffering malnutrition.[14] Yet, this emergency assistance also served a second 
objective which was to foster private enterprise: 
 
The fundamental objective was to assist the partner country in its efforts to sustain essential minimum 
levels of production and consumption during the initial period of disruption of the economy and the 
distribution system as a result of the reform process. An added objective, however, was to promote as 
early as possible the advent of private farming and private enterprise in agriculture.[15] 
 
This objective included introducing to the CEE concepts such as pricing, service, contracts, customer 
relationships, and the basic notions of supply and demand.[16]  Therefore, Phare observed four 
operational guidelines during the delivery of its emergency assistance to guarantee that private actors 
would participate in the process and raise the level of competition.  First, it preferred only non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to import and distribute the emergency input supplies. Second, it 
sold the supplies at world market prices where it found sufficient demand and prohibited the use of 
price subsidies. Third, it sold the supplies by public action or open tender and restricted each buyer’s 
total quantity of purchase to allow emerging entrepreneurs ample opportunity to bid. Finally, it 
assigned National Aid Coordinators to organize and execute the sales rather than ministries of 
agriculture or traditional government procurement and import agencies. If these guidelines were 
observed, then Phare delivered the input supplies and provided technical assistance to locate and 
organize the auctions and tenders, install accounting and reporting systems, transport the supplies, and 
train local counterparts.  Afterward, Phare allowed CEE officials to manage the sales and distribution. 
As a final step, the revenue generated by these sales was channeled into local currency counterpart 
funds which were collected and managed by national authorities.  They used these funds to finance 
infrastructure projects, purchase additional inputs, and alleviate the social hardships of transition. 
These four guidelines are significant because they reflect Phare’s aim to minimize the role of 
government and maximize the role of private actors during the delivery of supplies. In providing 
emergency assistance, Phare chose to bypass government channels and catalyze the emergence of a 
competitive supply market. Yet, pressures did exist for Phare to conduct its projects by other means:  
for example, if Phare had sold livestock feed at subsidized prices rather than world market prices, then 
it would have eased the cost burden for capital-deficient farmers and suppliers and accelerated the pace 
of its auctions. However, Phare chose a less charitable route in order to spur competitive market 
behavior and avoid leaving emerging entrepreneurs dependent on government handouts. Thus, it 
perceived the means and ends of its assistance as equally vital. 
Meanwhile, Phare also worked with the CEE to develop overall agricultural reform strategies so that 
their governments could look beyond their short-term needs and envision the long-term structure of 
their agricultural sector. Phare funded market experts to conduct exploratory studies of the CEE 
agricultural sector, assess its comparative advantage, and highlight its growth potential.  Phare also 
participated in joint task forces and missions with the World Bank and other IFIs to prepare regional 
studies. Finally, Phare provided experts and advisory services to train CEE experts in the ministries of 
agriculture and research institutes in order to strengthen the CEE’s local capacity for exploiting its 
agricultural assets; for example, CEE analysts could now prepare competitive commodity policies and 
assess the options for institutional and structural reform.[17] Overall, Phare’s objective was to 
empower CEE officials to implement independently of Phare their own agricultural reforms. 
Yet, Phare was cautious about expanding the role of CEE governments too much because they had 
attempted agricultural reforms in the past and failed due to inadequately prepared policies.  Hungary 
introduced the first reform model in 1968 as the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) which reoriented 
agricultural policy around market instruments like prices, credits, and taxes and discarded state 
controls like quotas and subsidies.[18]  The aim was to make production more flexible and efficient 
than previously possible under rigid, centralized planning, so the NEM reduced bureaucratic meddling 
and expanded the role of market forces. For example, suppliers now competed for farm business 
instead of merely fulfilling state orders.  Bulgaria then launched its own NEM in 1979 with a far more 
conservative design.[19]  Its NEM emphasized farm structure in the belief that economies of scale 
would improve productivity.  Thus, it integrated cooperatives and state farms into agro-industrial 
complexes (AICs) and permitted these massive enterprises greater autonomy.  For example, it reduced 
the number of state planning indicators and allowed AICs to decide their acreage, livestock inventories, 
and employment levels. 
Yet, the Hungarian and Bulgarian NEMs failed for two reasons.[20] First, they both pursued an 
incomplete approach to reform by tinkering with certain aspects of the agricultural problem and not 
addressing all the inter-related issues.  For example, public investment levels declined during these 
periods of reform, so moribund capital stocks could not be replaced.  This oversight caused serious 
infrastructure difficulties:  in Bulgaria, only 25 percent of the arable land was irrigated, and this 
inadequate portion was poorly maintained. Also, the costs of transportation, equipment, and inputs rose 
due to problems in food storage and machine repair. The introduction of market forces thus made little 
impact when there were no accompanying changes in the agricultural infrastructure. Second, the 
Hungarian and Bulgarian governments intervened too much in the operation of the agricultural market 
and disrupted natural adjustment processes. For example, they refused to allow gaps in rural incomes 
to widen because they were ideologically committed to income equality. Yet, this process should have 
occurred as farms adjusted to the new market conditions differently depending on their relative 
efficiencies.  Altogether, the Hungarian and Bulgarian NEMs had ambitious designs, but they failed 
because they did not address inter-related market and structural issues and did not allow market forces 
to operate without government intervention. 
The Phare approach to agricultural policy accounted for these mistakes by advising the CEE to play 
two roles.  In the short-term, they should prevent severe economic shock by continuing to intervene in 
the agricultural sector and preventing farms and enterprises from collapsing under the competitive 
pressures of a free market. Yet, in the long-term, the CEE governments should increasingly withdraw 
from the sector and merely manage the agricultural transition to international competitiveness: 
 
The basic objective was thus to help establish as quickly as possible a national policy capability to 
manage the transition to a market-economic agricultural sector which would become internationally 
competitive in the long run, while taking into account the need to preserve, over the short run, 
minimum economic activity and employment levels to sustain the overall reform process.[21] 
 
Phare thus characterized this long-term government role as both comprehensive and non-
interventionist.  Unlike the old Hungarian and Bulgarian NEMs, the Phare approach recognized that 
agricultural production is a complex process, so successful reform must address not just farm structure 
and production, but also rural credit, agri-processing, and food marketing.  Phare did not fall into the 
trap of targeting a single defect: 
 
There is a tendency for observers...to attribute the shortcomings in agriculture to the structure of the 
farms.  But this is clearly not correct, nor is it very informative.  The farms operate within a system of 
related institutions (input supplies, marketing and procurement agencies, credit institutions) and 
policies (output and input prices, wage controls, and procurement regulations)...All the features of the 
agricultural scene count much more than any one characteristic, even that of private ownership of 
farms.[22] 
 
Phare advised the CEE governments to play a managerial role during the transition in order to build the 
proper framework in which private actors and market forces could guide production.  Phare expected 
them to demonstrate persistence and self-discipline, particularly when confronted by domestic 
demands for protection.  These pressures had appeared since the start of the transition as consumers, 
farmers, and enterprises experienced the shocks of price liberalization and other macro-economic 
stabilization measures.  Yet, if the CEE governments decided to intervene, then they would slow the 
transition: 
 
The economic shocks associated with the transition have led many officials to favor highly 
interventionist policies over the long, slow process of building institutions... Whether Central European 
governments adopt EU-like agricultural policies or whether they attempt to resurrect the grain 
monopolies of the 1930s, the inevitable result will be a significant drain on the state budget and high 
consumer prices.  The ultimate impact of such policies will be to slow down the transition.[23] 
 
These pressures were expected to continue as long as the transition caused serious disruptions in the 
agricultural sector.  The response of the CEE governments would thus prove critical:  “The question of 
whether and how governments should respond to agriculture’s financial difficulties will remain the 
dominant policy issue of the transition.”[24] Phare’s approach was to encourage the CEE governments 
to manage the agricultural reform rather than dominate it. This preference for free trade over 
protectionism becomes even more clear in examining the second stage of agricultural assistance where 
Phare focused on three projects—land reform, enterprise development, and rural credit expansion. 
 
Land Reform 
 
Land reform is a core issue in the agricultural reform because it addresses one of the fundamental 
differences between communism and capitalism—private land ownership.  The CEE governments can 
redistribute their collectivized land in one of three ways:  first, they can restitute the land to families 
which had owned the land prior to collectivization;  second, they can redistribute the land equally 
among members of the collectives and state farms;  and third, they can auction the land.  Each 
approach promised an advantage.  Restitutions would provide an opportunity for the CEE governments 
to compensate families that had been victimized by the atrocities of Stalinist collectivization.[25] 
Distributions would offer a reward to farm employees who had worked the land for decades. Finally, 
auctions would create a land market in which the forces of supply and demand could determine 
efficient farm sizes. In sum, the choice was between justice, equity, and efficiency. 
Phare focused on the technical aspects of land reform because it was concerned with consolidating 
farms into efficient sizes.  It worried that restitution and redistribution might undermine potential 
efficiency gains:  “[Either] policy might lead to excessive fragmentation of agricultural assets and land 
which would be counterproductive for the sector and would lead to further considerable drops in 
agricultural production.”[26]  Phare thus concentrated on erecting a competitive land market that 
would allow farmers to consolidate their individual plots into efficient, small- and medium-sized farms, 
similar to the EU where 93 percent of the 7 million farms possess less than 50 hectares.[27]  To this 
end, Phare increased its land reform funding from ECU 2 million in 1990 to ECU 16 million in 1993, 
reaching a four-year total of ECU 41 million.  In the process, it delivered several types of technical 
assistance: 
 
The objective is to provide much needed equipment, training, and technical assistance in order to speed 
up the process of land registration and issuance of titles, which would provide legal security for 
farming activities, to help establish uniform cadastral services, to set up nationwide land information 
systems and promote the development of land markets, and, often, to provide a basis for taxation.[28] 
 
Land registration has proven a complicated and painstaking task for several reasons.[29] First, the CEE 
communist governments based their land records on use, not ownership, so property rights lack clarity.  
Second, they did not update their records regularly, and many cartography and registry systems 
deteriorated.  Finally, they did not automate their records.  Therefore, the CEE governments need to 
reconstruct their land information systems quickly because they are critical to a wide range of 
economic activities—tax and fees assessment, physical planning, civil engineering projects, and real 
estate mortgages and marketing—and information inefficiencies will slow the process of land reform.  
Therefore, Phare made land reform a high priority with 17.5 percent of its budget in 1993.  For 
example, Phare provided an ECU 5 million grant to Slovakia in order “to support the establishment of 
a property market and the general restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises by 
removing constraints to the efficient and effective registration and verification of land ownership.”[30]  
Phare delivered technical assistance to digitize maps, computerize the survey and geodetic control 
network, and train staff in the Authority of Geodesy, Cartography, and Cadastre to apply these new 
technologies.  It also provided funds to accelerate the processing of land ownership claims and 
registration of land sales.  In other projects, Phare used aerial photographs and satellite images to 
identify potential land use, improved data transmissions to public administration offices, and advised 
CEE governments on drafting laws for property rights, land valuation, leasing, and inheritance.  In sum, 
Phare provided the tools to build successful land information systems and auction markets which 
would facilitate the sale of land through private channels.  By minimizing the scope of government 
land ownership and maximizing the flow of market information, Phare sought to erect well-functioning 
land markets that could serve as the foundation for efficient CEE agriculture. 
 
Enterprise Development 
 
Phare approached enterprise development as perhaps the most critical transition issue because it will 
transform the relationship between CEE agriculture and government.  During the communist period, 
centralized planning and government monopolization of production badly distorted agriculture.  
Therefore, Phare seeks to shrink the role of the CEE governments and foster the growth of private 
enterprise as a means to unleash the key market force that was lacking from communist agriculture—
competition: 
 
Phare’s fundamental objective is to introduce effective competition as quickly as possible in the farm 
sector and in the upstream and downstream industries.  State farms, cooperatives, and state-owned or 
state-directed enterprises involved in commercial agricultural activity should therefore be restructured 
and privatized so that, firstly, commercial activities are separated from non-commercial ones...and 
secondly, large farms or dominant trading enterprises are reformed or broken down into separate, 
smaller units...[31] 
 
Phare’s approach to enterprise development thus included two components.  First, the rapid 
privatization and structural adjustment of state-owned farms and enterprises is essential because the 
CEE has to overcome the inertia of state ownership that was entrenched by four decades of communist 
policy;  a slow approach might stall once domestic forces begin to resist this radical change.  Phare 
assisted this process by devising a privatization strategy that would sell state-owned farms and 
enterprises to private individuals and businesses while allowing the CEE to sustain necessary levels of 
food production, distribution, and storage capacity and reduce the social costs of closing inefficient 
enterprises.  Phare also funded audits, valuations, management reviews, and business plans on a sector-
by-sector basis to prepare and enhance an enterprise’s profitability before attracting an investor or 
buyer.  However, Phare also advised CEE governments not to pursue revenue maximization as an 
objective because a focus on profits would slow the pace of privatization.  It also advised them not to 
restrict the participation of foreign investors and over-protect managers and employees of the 
auctioned enterprises.  Overall, Phare’s objective was to privatize farms and enterprises in a manner 
that was both fast-paced and minimally disruptive. 
The dismantling of production and trade monopolies constituted the second component of Phare’s 
approach to enterprise development.  Phare advocated that CEE governments approve anti-monopoly 
legislation to prevent privatized enterprises in the supply, agri-processing, and distribution sectors from 
continuing to enjoy their old monopoly status.  It also recommended the removal of legal barriers, such 
as discriminatory tax laws, which blocked the formation of new enterprises.  This process was 
expected to proceed with difficulty: 
 
“To achieve the condition of rational competition will be one of the most demanding tasks of reform, 
as in the past nearly total monopolization existed in the agriculture and food sector.”[32] 
 
Yet, Phare argued that if these monopolies were not dismantled, then the CEE economy would not 
achieve a sustainable market equilibrium.  Phare allocated to Romania, for example, an ECU 4 million 
grant in 1992 to build private sector distribution networks.[33]  Although the Romanian government 
had abolished official price controls, it still had de facto monopoly power, especially in distribution.  
Therefore, Phare provided information on processes such as cold storage, freezing, foodstuff handling, 
and shop-fitting to private wholesalers and retailers to boost their competitiveness.  It also established a 
Market Information System to augment the Ministry of Trade’s weekly journal of commodity prices 
and built a computer network to transmit data daily to each district and media source.  With greater 
access to information, farmers could then make more informed business decisions. 
In this regard, Phare advocated the participation of CEE governments.  It felt they could effectively 
disseminate essential market information, the lack of which had proved a major flaw in communist 
centralized planning because managers could not properly allocate resources and schedule production: 
 
“The institutional organization of centrally planned agriculture, both at the level of the firm and in 
inter-firm transactions, fails grandly and fundamentally because information is costly.”[34] 
 
Phare believed that private sector competition would stimulate the flow of information based on supply 
and demand, but it also recognized that CEE governments could enable this information to reach a 
wider audience.  In effect, Phare accepted the argument that to adopt a market system without any 
consideration for the government is too simplistic.[35] Therefore, enterprise development did not 
involve the withering away of the state, but instead required its reformulation in a positive, non-
interventionist role as facilitator of information flows.  Yet, Phare also warned that recent interventions 
by the CEE governments—in which they prevented markets from establishing accurate sales prices 
and subsidized enterprises in a way that clouded their market value—had slowed the pace of 
privatization: 
 
[Privatization] has been accompanied by continued interventionist policies and heavy subsidies for 
state enterprises, often conflicting with the need for monetary austerity or with what the national state 
budget could afford.  Whilst this might have been justified...in order to assure essential food supplies in 
the early stages of transition or to cushion the social effects of adjustment, it will be necessary in the 
medium term to achieve effective competition, so that the private farmer and agro-industrial 
enterprises receive correct price signals from the markets.[36] 
 
The CEE governments were reluctant to relinquish control over the market because agricultural policy 
concerns food security—a social welfare issue regarded as the responsibility of government, not the 
private sector. Phare sympathized with their interventionist tendencies, but it objected to this role 
because it calculated that excessive interventionism merely distorted the market and prevented the flow 
of key market information. 
 
Rural Credit Expansion 
 
Finally, rural credit is essential to the transition because CEE farmers and agricultural enterprises 
require financing to grow and restructure, such as using credit to purchase machinery and mortgages to 
expand their landholdings. Yet, a rural credit culture did not exist during the communist period.  
Farmers financed their investments through state-controlled central bank loans that were subsidized by 
negative real interest rates.  Credit allocations did not correlate with merit, and these subsidized loans 
constituted a soft budget constraint on agricultural enterprises which merely discouraged them from 
pursuing financially prudent behavior.[37] Yet, even in a fully-functioning free market, credit does not 
flow freely to the countryside because farmers have a difficult time maintaining their credit worthiness:  
first, they are geographically isolated from main capital markets, so lending acquires an additional 
transaction cost;  second, they require large credit advances and must delay in repaying their debt 
while they wait to harvest and sell their produce;  and third, they hold much of their wealth in farmland, 
an undiversified investment which may become insolvent when agricultural prices and land values 
decline.  Given these obstacles even in a well-developed free market, the CEE faced a formidable 
challenge:  “The challenge policy-makers face is to find a way to reap the advantages of privatization 
while minimizing the distortions and wealth inequality that arise from capital market 
imperfections.”[38] 
 
Phare advocated rural credit schemes as a means to spur capital infusions into the countryside.  Since 
the start of the transition, only limited amounts of capital had reached the small, agricultural 
entrepreneurs because commercial banks regarded them as high-risk loan applicants who lacked 
collateral and maintained unreliable accounting and performance records.  Moreover, high interest 
rates had impeded their borrowing.  Therefore, Phare designed rural credit guarantees to meet the 
capital needs of private farms and agri-businesses: 
 
The objective is to promote private sector development in agriculture during the initial period of 
transition by facilitating the mobilization of capital assistance for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
in farming and related sectors of processing, marketing, and distribution, to enhance complementarity 
with the loans of International Financial Institutions by providing guarantees to available credit lines, 
and to stimulate an emerging agricultural credit culture in general.[39] 
 
In Hungary, for example, Phare implemented a rural credit program to establish an efficient banking 
network, increase capital mobilization, and enlarge rural lending capacity.  This project consisted of 
two parts.[40] First, Phare delivered an ECU 2 million grant to prepare a plan of action with the 
National Federation of Savings Cooperatives, advise cooperatives on disbursing IFI funds, develop 
human resources, and computerize loan operations. Second, it channeled ECU 3 million through the 
Capital Development Facility to attract other institutions to use the rural cooperatives as credit 
channels. It also helped the savings cooperatives to meet the minimum capital requirements, increase 
their equity bases, establish a Common Deposit Insurance Scheme, and restructure the savings 
cooperative network. In Poland, Phare assisted regional and local banks to meet their licensing criteria 
and assisted the government to meet its obligations to the World Bank under the conditions of its 
Agricultural Development Project loan.[41]  Finally, in other projects, Phare contributed to the drafting 
of legal frameworks for credit institutions—their statutes, modes of operation, accounting systems, and 
management structures—while training agricultural loan officers in the practices of credit appraisal, 
portfolio management, accounting, and fund management. 
Again, Phare advocated a positive, non-interventionist role for CEE governments in which they would 
create a suitable environment for credit expansion. For example, they could make the agricultural 
sector more attractive to commercial banks by passing consistent tax legislation and refusing to 
subsidize unprofitable enterprises. Also, they could avoid restricting the lending activities of 
commercial banks with loan quotas and interest rate limits. Finally, they could insist on timely debt 
repayment and enforce penalties for non-repayment in order to discipline the rural credit market. In 
sum, the CEE governments could stimulate private sector growth by improving capital mobility 
without disrupting market signals. 
 
Future Orientations 
 
In June 1994, Phare published an agricultural strategy paper in which it articulated its frustration with 
the widening gap between Phare policy objectives and CEE reforms.  In the early stage of the 
transition, Phare had cooperated closely with the CEE in delivering emergency input supplies.  
However, as Phare assistance evolved to the second stage of structural reform, the views of Phare and 
the CEE governments started to diverge over the issue of government interventionism.  For each 
project—land reform, enterprise development, and rural credit expansion—Phare had defined the 
limits to which the CEE governments should intervene.  Yet, Phare now complained that they had 
exceeded these boundaries and intervened too much in matters that were best left to the private sector: 
 
There is...a growing discrepancy between what should be the longer-term aims of agricultural reform 
in the central and eastern European countries—the development of efficient and internationally-
competitive agricultural production based on private-sector initiative and free market prices—and the 
short-term agricultural measures introduced lately, which are increasingly becoming interventionist in 
nature.[42] 
 
Phare’s long-term aim for CEE agriculture thus conflicts not only with recent measures introduced by 
the CEE governments, but also with the objectives of the CAP.  First, Phare describes CEE agriculture 
in terms of efficiency and competitiveness, not income stability and self-sufficiency. Second, it bases 
agricultural production on private sector initiative and free market prices, not government planning and 
subsidized prices. As such, Phare’s conception of agricultural policy demonstrates a marked shift from 
the protectionist orientation of the CAP.  The most glaring difference is Phare’s belief that CEE 
governments should not provide price subsidies because farmers should compete for their profits like 
actors in any other sector.  Phare believes this process will increase productivity, decrease costs, make 
efficient farmers more profitable, and benefit consumers with lower food prices.  In effect, agricultural 
policy will contribute not only to the income of farmers, but also to the welfare of society—an 
objective not shared by the CAP. 
Yet, Phare recognized a short-term need for CEE government intervention to absorb the early shocks 
of transition.  To advocate complete government withdrawal from the agricultural sector would seem 
unwise because such an abrupt change would cause excessive market imbalance and suffering.  
Therefore, Phare advised the CEE governments to intervene and prevent public opinion from turning 
against reform: 
 
It should...be recognized that the infrastructure and incentive systems created under the old Communist 
regime cannot be rectified overnight without high social, political, and economic costs.  During the 
early stages of the restructuring process, therefore, there is a need for more government involvement in 
the economy than would normally be the case in some European Union Member States.  Indeed, the 
central and eastern European countries have to strike a balance and maintain sufficient reform 
momentum by preventing that the social cost increases to a point where popular support for the 
reforms would be lost.[43] 
 
Phare objected to the recent behavior of the CEE governments because they were obstructing progress 
toward a free market economy and jeopardizing Phare’s long-term aim.  Therefore, Phare decided to 
orient its future assistance around projects that would minimize government intervention: 
 
Phare will therefore support policy reforms and programs of assistance in the countries concerned to 
ensure that this dichotomy which has developed in policy is clarified, and that operations in the 
agricultural sectors of the central and eastern European countries are consistent with modern market-
economy principles.  This will eventually call for less government involvement in the sector, similar to 
the situation which prevails in the European Union Member States.[44] 
 
Yet, this repeated comparison of the CEE governments to EU Member States seems paradoxical.  On 
the one hand, Phare argues that as the agricultural sector shifts to a free market, CEE government 
interventionism will decline to EU levels.  On the other hand, it asserts that recent CEE government 
interventionism is explained by the CEE’s effort to harmonize their agricultural policies with the CAP 
in preparation for EU membership.[45]  These two assertions produce a paradox:  how can Phare claim 
that the CEE governments excessively intervene in the agricultural sector because they are 
harmonizing with the CAP, but also argue that CEE interventionism will decline to EU levels as the 
CEE economy transforms into a competitive free market?  This logic implies that the CAP is both the 
cause and the solution to CEE interventionism.  Evidently, there is a flaw in Phare’s logic. The solution 
to this paradox, though, becomes clear in examining Phare’s plans for its future orientations in 
agricultural assistance where it outlines three goals—policy convergence, productivity enhancement, 
and export growth. 
First, Phare planned to assist the convergence between CEE and EU policy because agriculture has 
both economic and political sensitivities and so will likely engender a major debate in CEE 
negotiations for EU membership.  Phare thus advised the CEE governments to approximate the CAP’s 
legal and regulatory framework and to raise their standards for quality, packaging, and hygiene to CAP 
levels.  Yet, Phare also noted that more consideration should be given to reformulating the CAP: 
 
Policy coordination in agriculture will clearly be an important future step and will have to take as its 
starting-point the policy existing on each side.  Reflection is only just beginning within the European 
Union as to the development of the Common Agricultural Policy and the extent to which it will be 
reformulated to take account of the agriculture sectors of the associated central and eastern European 
countries.[46] 
 
By suggesting that the CAP will be altered in preparation for EU enlargement, Phare clarifies that 
policy convergence will involve a two-way process in which the CAP and CEE adapt to each other’s 
conditions.    
In other words, Phare believes that the CAP and the CEE should both start to dismantle their 
interventionist policies in order to facilitate EU enlargement.  Convergence, then, will not merely mean 
CEE imitation of the CAP. 
For its second future orientation, Phare planned to enhance agricultural productivity.  So far, CEE 
farmers had not yet realized the full potential of their crop and livestock outputs because of structural 
deficiencies, distorted incentives, input shortages, high costs, and inefficient operations—carry-over 
effects from the communist period.  As a result of these adverse conditions, CEE growth rates turned 
negative.  From 1989 to 1992, for example, outputs of coarse grain, dairy products, and wheat fell by 
17 percent, 21 percent, and 29 percent, respectively (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6:  Agricultural Output, 1986-1992 
(millions tons)  
Average % Change  
  1986-1989 1990 1991 1992 1989-1992 
Wheat   32.1  34.3 31.4 22.8 29.0 
Dairy  30.9  30.7 27.5 24.5 20.7 
Coarse Grain 48.2  43.2 51.5 39.8 17.4 
Meat  6.6  6.7 6.5 6.0 9.1 
 
Source:  Phare, “Progress and Strategy Paper”  p. 12.  This data includes Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
 
Phare thus decided to concentrate on removing the structural obstacles to growth in productivity. To 
this end, it proposed to expand its existing projects for extension and advisory services, as well as rural 
credit and investment schemes. It would also pursue three new goals.  First, it would restructure 
research institutes and deliver their analytical findings to farmers to raise their level of expertise. 
Second, it would improve farm management in areas such as quality control and accounting. Third, it 
would fund public infrastructure projects and promote micro-enterprise development in upstream and 
downstream industries for depressed regions which are suffering problems in soil fertility, farm income, 
and unemployment. Overall, Phare would continue to insist on a minimalist role for the CEE 
governments so that they intervene only when they can quantify the benefits: 
 
If, in view of future relations with the European Union, [CEE] governments were advised to develop 
support measures, this should be encouraged only if based on accurate assessment of farm or enterprise 
income and expenditure data and rational consideration of the economic, social, environmental, fiscal, 
and other costs and benefits of using resources in this way.[47] 
 
Again, Phare’s approach to agricultural policy differs from the CAP.  Phare states that support 
measures must be assessed not just in terms of farm and enterprise income, but also in terms of social, 
environmental, and budgetary effect.  Such standards are not applied in the CAP where price supports 
are explicitly linked to rural incomes in the annual price review without due consideration for other 
consequences.  This oversight is reflected, for example, in the fact that rural income disparities have 
widened.  Phare’s approach thus refuses to allow an unrestrained rise in government interventionism 
even though this policy might promise to ease temporarily the pains of transition. 
Finally, Phare proposed to orient its future agricultural assistance around export promotion.  Phare 
calculated that trade is critical to the transition because it will expand the foreign market for CEE 
agricultural products and raise the level of domestic competition.  As a result, trade will have a highly 
positive effect: 
 
External trade is extremely important for the effects which it can have on the efficiency, growth, and 
development of gross production in the agriculture sector.  In this respect, the Europe Agreements have 
been a significant step forward for the sector as a whole because of the potential for market access, the 
abolition of trade restrictions, and, as a result, the growth of exports and production which they imply 
in the medium term.[48] 
 
Phare would thus assist CEE farmers to realize their export potential by providing a variety of 
technical assistance.  First, it would finance sectoral studies to assess the comparative advantage and 
export potential of CEE products, particularly in the EU market.  Earlier reviews had evaluated five 
markets—cereals, meat, dairy, horticulture, and sugar—but Phare would now broaden its scope to 
include the entire food chain—primary production, secondary production, distribution, export, and 
import. The CEE could then compete more effectively with the EU outside of basic commodities. 
Second, it would erect border controls, improve communication facilities, supply diagnostic and 
laboratory equipment for product testing, and ensure compliance with EU sanitary regulations. Third, it 
would encourage EU firms to start joint-ventures and invest directly in the CEE processing industry by 
conducting feasibility studies, providing pre-investment and training funds, and assisting enterprise-to-
enterprise cooperation schemes that enable CEE agri-businesses to expand their distribution and 
marketing networks. Finally, it would train CEE employees in marketing techniques to promote 
agricultural exports. In sum, Phare’s objective would be to increase CEE exports, particularly in the 
market for high value-added, processed products so that it could accumulate critical foreign capital. 
Again, Phare’s approach to agricultural policy conflicts with the CAP because it sought to promote 
export competition with the EU.  In 1990, CEE agricultural exports declined dramatically as trade in 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) plummeted and the Soviet Union increasingly 
demanded payment for its energy and raw materials exports in hard currency rather than agricultural 
barter. Nevertheless, Phare expected a return to higher production levels and a decline in CEE food 
consumption, at which point the CEE could export more agricultural commodities. By delivering 
technical assistance to facilitate this turn-around, Phare would enable the CEE to challenge the CAP’s 
protectionist agricultural trade barriers, which remained high under the Europe Agreements (see 
Section Three).  Phare could have advised a less confrontational strategy, such as urging the CEE to 
pursue a goal of national self-sufficiency, but such a strategy would not have maximized the CEE trade 
potential and would not have deepened the structures of the emerging free market economy. 
In sum, these three future orientations explain Phare’s paradoxical comparison of CEE government 
interventionism to the EU Member States by revealing the extent to which Phare bases its agricultural 
policy on free trade principles. In each orientation, Phare identifies a point of disagreement with the 
CAP: first, it states that policy convergence between the CEE and EU should be complemented by 
CAP reform; second, it argues that the CEE governments should intervene in agriculture only if they 
can demonstrate the benefits to farm and enterprise income, as well as the society, environment, and 
budget; and third, it challenges CAP protectionism by promoting CEE export growth. Each orientation 
thus reflects a dynamic vision of protectionism:  CEE governments intervene too extensively in 
agriculture because they are harmonizing with the current CAP structure, but Phare argues that these 
interventions will decline to EU levels as the free market develops because CAP protectionism will 
also decline.  In effect, Phare anticipates that its future orientations—policy convergence, productivity 
enhancement, and export promotion—will encourage both the EU and the CEE to shift toward free 
trade. 
 
3. PHARE POLICY NETWORK 
 
Phare assistance to the CEE acquired special importance after the EU made enlargement a high priority 
of the transition.  At its Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, the European Council offered CEE 
signatories of the Europe Agreements—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, and soon 
after, Bulgaria and Romania—the prospect of EU membership upon fulfilling certain political and 
economic pre-conditions.  The Europe Agreements thus clarified EU-CEE relations and made EU 
membership the central objective of CEE foreign policies.  They also heightened the profile of the 
Phare program by naming it and the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the two EU financial 
institutions that would prepare the CEE for accession.[49] Consequently, Phare developed a critical 
niche role as an institutional liaison between the EU and CEE.  This responsibility required Phare to 
begin harmonizing CEE laws, norms, and practices with EU standards in areas like competition policy, 
intellectual property, and worker protection.  Above all, it required Phare to address the formidable 
issue of preparing CEE agriculture for integration into the EU’s most politically sensitive and 
economically interventionist policy—the CAP. 
The previous section showed that Phare agricultural assistance to the CEE from 1990 to 1994 was 
formulated on free trade principles, as it strived to reduce government intervention, increase intra-
sectoral competition, and encourage firms to export agricultural products to the EU.  As a result, the 
Phare model for CEE agriculture diverged from the CAP model of protectionist agriculture.  This 
section investigates the means by which Phare developed such a contradictory policy:  first, it analyzes 
key features of the Phare policy network and compares them to the CAP policy network;  second, it 
offers a broader look at EU-CEE agricultural relations and outlines the contradictions between EU 
agricultural aid and trade objectives which resulted from the gap between the Phare and CAP policy 
networks;  and third, it assesses the link between agricultural policy and EU enlargement and discusses 
the impact that Phare and the CAP may have on this vital issue. 
 
Structure of the Network 
 
The concept of Phare originated in July 1989 as the West tried to respond rapidly to the unanticipated 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The Group of Seven (G-7) agreed to send assistance to 
Poland and Hungary, the first two CEE countries to embark on the post-communist transition, and 
assigned the European Commission two tasks:  first, it would coordinate all bilateral aid programs 
implemented by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group also 
called the G-24, and it would participate in regular consultations between the OECD and major 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)—the EIB, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).[50] Second, the G-7 instructed the 
Commission to manage an independent assistance program, called Phare, with funds from the EU 
budget.[51] Therefore, Phare seemed a unique EU program from the outset because it was initiated by 
the G-7 outside the EU institutional framework. In practice, Phare would answer to the Commission’s 
supervisory authority and so represent EU interests, but, in principle, it was also mandated to 
complement the assistance of the IFIs and other bilateral donors. 
The Phare program is managed by the Phare Operational Service (PHOS) within the Commission’s 
DG-I. Its staff is divided into four operating units which utilize Commission resources both in Brussels 
and the EU delegations that are located in most CEE capitals. The main dialogue of the Phare policy-
making process occurs between PHOS and the CEE recipients. These two bodies work in partnership 
to design assistance projects on the condition that each CEE recipient maintains a commitment to 
democracy and a free market economy.  The Phare program is thus demand-driven: the CEE recipients 
submit their requests for assistance, then assume full responsibility for program implementation. This 
approach contrasts with the methods of the IFIs: the IMF, for example, imposes strict conditions on its 
stand-by credits in order to monitor the recipient’s macro-economic stability. Yet, the Phare program 
pursues a different objective and so employs different a means:  it strives toward micro-economic 
change, so it takes more account of local conditions. Rather than evaluating each CEE recipient against 
a fixed set of indices, Phare appreciates that each country operates under different pressures, reaches 
the stages of transition at different times, and holds a different opinion about the proper sequencing of 
reform. Thus, Phare adjusts to the particular interests and needs of each CEE recipient and engages in a 
highly interactive partnership: 
 
...Phare constitutes, in essence, a government-to-government program, the objectives, scope, means, 
and methods of which are identified and defined in a continuous dialogue between the European 
Commission and the respective partner governments...Generally speaking, only those projects and 
ventures which have been retained in partner governments’ reform policies and have been presented by 
them to the European Commission for funding are considered for support.[52] 
 
This interaction continues throughout the annual programming cycle which begins when the Council 
of Ministers and EP approve the Phare budget in the annual EU budget. The Member States then agree 
on guidelines for Phare assistance, and the Commission allocates funds to the CEE recipients and 
regional programs while taking into account three factors—first, special instructions contained in the 
EU budget commentaries;  second, Phare guidelines agreed by the Member States;  and third, country 
orientations agreed with the Phare Management Committee, a body of Member State representatives. 
Also, these allocations are based on objective criteria, such as national population and GDP, and 
subjective criteria, such as level of commitment to the reform process.  Once these allocations are 
finished, the PHOS prepares strategy documents for each CEE recipient and submits them to the Phare 
Management Committee. The CEE recipients are notified of their funding, then they determine their 
priority reform areas in consultation with the Commission and outside experts, as necessary. Together, 
these groups draft Indicative Programs to specify the objectives and framework for each project and 
indicate the main sectors to be financed. Increasingly, these Indicative Programs are projected over 
several years so that Phare develops a longer-term perspective, but the spending commitments remain 
annual. Phare then collaborates with CEE ministries, institutions, and organizations to identify, analyze, 
and appraise these projects on a technical level, and their assessments contribute to a document called 
the Financing Proposal, which describes the content and conditions for each project.  Again, the Phare 
Management Committee, which meets about six times a year, scrutinizes the Financing Proposal and 
offers its opinion to the Commission before a final vote.  If approved, the Commission and CEE 
recipients then sign a Financing Memorandum to complete the programming cycle after a period of 
twelve to fourteen months.  The outcome of this year-long interaction is well-targeted programming in 
which Phare assistance is made directly relevant to each CEE recipient’s reform policies and 
priorities.[53] 
During the next stage of the Phare policy-making process, CEE recipients become more deeply 
involved as they assume responsibility for implementation. In each country, Phare appoints a National 
Coordinator to allocate funds between government ministries and to supervise projects throughout the 
planning, programming, and implementation stages. This coordinator, who is usually a minister or 
state secretary, also informs the PHOS about changes in the recipient’s priorities. The actual start-up 
and management of projects is then handled by Project Management Units (PMUs) which are sector-
specific organizations staffed by local civil servants from the relevant government ministries and 
implementing agencies;  they also receive support from Phare-funded experts, as necessary. The PMUs 
represent the driving force behind Phare on the ground because they prepare, implement, and monitor 
Phare projects, launch tenders for supplies and services, and award contracts in accordance with EU 
financial regulations. These responsibilities bring the PMUs into contact with a wide range of 
enterprises:  a single agricultural project, for example, may require professional skills for legal drafting, 
aerial surveying, rural credit management, and technical training. Generally, the awarded enterprises 
must fulfill four criteria:  first, they must maintain a long-term presence in the CEE recipient by 
establishing local offices and employing local staff; second, they must provide expertise from all EU 
Member States, if possible; third, they must implement projects and train local officials;  and fourth, 
they must be non-commercial. These criteria thus narrow the pool of applicants and restrict the number 
of enterprises lobbying for Phare grants. 
In 1992, Phare completed its first three years of operations and was due to expire, but in November, 
the Council of Ministers reviewed its performance favorably. The widening of its scope and the 
realization that the CEE transition would require more time compelled the Council to extend Phare 
funding until 1997.[54] Meanwhile, it also recommended three new guidelines—multi-annual 
programming, investment support, and decentralization: 
 
In order to integrate Phare assistance more effectively into the process of medium-term restructuring, a 
multi-annual approach to programming should be adopted with more explicit policy objectives and 
conditionality and increased concentration of aid on key sectors;  increased support for investment 
should be envisaged alongside technical assistance;  [and] to be able to respond rapidly to the needs of 
the [CEE], efforts should be made to further streamline implementation procedures, including more 
decentralization, while ensuring that aid quality was maintained.[55] 
 
As Phare streamlined and decentralized its operations, the PMUs assumed greater importance and the 
CEE recipients acquired additional responsibilities.  Phare thus started to develop in the CEE recipients 
the requisite systems and capabilities for managing projects.  In the agricultural sector, for example, 
this reorientation caused a reshuffling of CEE bureaucracies so that large-scale agricultural projects 
could be managed entirely by the Ministry of Agriculture or a designated implementing authority.  
These changes in Phare thus spilled-over into changes in the CEE governments: 
 
...This decentralized system has had important consequences for the organizational behavior in the 
agriculture ministries, agencies, or organization in charge of a particular sectoral program and helped 
to build up a local management capacity—both administratively and substantively—within the 
organization concerned.[56] 
 
Phare further shifted responsibility for project management to the CEE by switching from annual to 
multi-annual programming.  This enabled the CEE recipients to manage their assistance with a longer-
term perspective because the guarantee of future grants would allow them to embark on comprehensive 
reforms without the risk of lost funding.  Phare also shifted from the first stage of assistance, in which 
it provided short-term aid like input supplies, to the second stage of assistance, in which it would 
stimulate investment for medium- and long-term restructuring projects.  The overall effect of these 
three alterations in Phare operations - decentralization, multi-annual programming, and investment 
support - was to improve the management capabilities of the CEE recipients and to enable them to 
maximize their foreign assistance by linking these funds into a longer-term reform framework. 
A secondary dialogue in the Phare policy-making process incorporates the major IFIs and bilateral 
donors, such as the US Agency for International Development.  Phare coordinates its activities with the 
bilateral donors in two ways.  First, it participates in the G-24 consultative framework, which involves 
regular meetings between senior officials in working groups intended to generate common policy 
objectives and actions in specific sectors.[57]  Second, Phare’s own sectoral projects erect coordination 
units in the CEE recipients to coordinate G-24 bilateral assistance.  Phare also collaborates with the 
IFIs in two ways.  First, it regularly exchanges project information with the IFIs, participates in joint 
activities—task forces, missions, reports, and studies—and occasionally co-implements projects.  For 
example, if the IMF provides financial advice to a CEE central bank concerning its policies and 
regulatory framework, and the World Bank provides loans for major, structural adjustments, then 
Phare funds employee training schemes and computer hardware purchases to complement the IMF and 
World Bank objectives.  Second, Phare acts as a multiplier by unlocking investment funds from the 
IFIs.  Phare does not support the general financing needs of CEE recipients, so it aims to stimulate 
other IFI investments by reducing the prohibitively high risks associated with various projects.  For 
example, Phare contributes to the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by financing 
feasibility studies, technology transfers, and credit guarantees. These risk-reducing activities then 
catalyze capital inflows from the IFIs to produce a “potent mixture” which greatly magnifies the total 
amount of assistance.[58]  The agricultural sector provides evidence of this effect: 
 
In the beginning of the reform, Phare financed expert assistance to help the countries formulate initial 
reform strategies, undertake economic sector studies, and assist with project implementation and 
coordination in agriculture.  In this, as in many other areas, Phare assistance was coordinated and co-
implemented as far as possible with the reviews and assistance of the World Bank, the EBRD, and 
other major multilateral or bilateral donors towards the sector...In this sense, complementarity was 
achieved, in that the technical assistance provided by Phare on a grant basis has often been 
instrumental in mobilizing loan financing by the International Financial Institutions for restructuring of 
agricultural sectors in the countries concerned.[59] 
 
The European Council recognized the value of this multiplier role and so decided at the Copenhagen 
Summit to allocate up to 15 percent of Phare’s funds exclusively for co-financing major infrastructure 
projects with the IFIs.  Overall, then, this coordination between Phare, the IFIs, and other bilateral 
donors creates a synergy that benefits the CEE recipients in two ways:  first, it enables them to define 
their sectoral strategies with clearer and more consistent targets, which is vital when the public is 
suffering through high inflation and massive unemployment in hopes of a brighter future;  and second, 
it creates a division of labor between the various donor bodies that reduces the potential for duplicated 
efforts.  Although the EP and European Court   
of Auditors have criticized the Phare projects for their overlap and inconsistency, coordination remains 
a high priority. 
In sum, the Phare policy network involves the interactions of three core actors—the PHOS, the CEE 
recipients, and the IFIs and other bilateral donors.  Therefore, the Phare policy network fulfills the 
Rhodes model definition of a policy community.  First, its membership is closed and stable.  The 
majority of policy-making activity occurs during the programming cycle between the PHOS and CEE 
recipients with secondary input from the IFIs and other bilateral donors.  The Council of Ministers and 
EP draft the overall budget, but they do not influence the key policy-making steps, such as fund 
allocation and strategy development.  Moreover, the Phare policy community is distinct from the CAP 
policy community because the PHOS is located in DG-I, not DG-VI, and it does not maintain official 
links with the national and EU agricultural interest groups, like COPA.  As a result, the representatives 
of large, commercial farmers do not participate in the core policy-making processes of the Phare policy 
community. 
Second, interactions in the Phare policy community are frequent and consensual.  The programming 
cycle lasts twelve to fourteen months, and the implementation cycle lasts one to several years, so the 
PHOS and CEE recipients maintain close contact year-round.  Moreover, consultations with the IFIs 
and other bilateral donors occur regularly, if less frequently, because the Commission is obliged to 
participate in the G-24 consultation mechanism.  These interactions are consensual because Phare 
adheres to a demand-driven approach:  whereas IMF relations with the CEE seem hierarchical due to 
the imposition of strict, macro-economic criteria, Phare relations with the CEE are more collegial due 
to their extensive collaboration.  Phare applies a set of common principles to its overall strategy, but it 
allows for variations in implementation.  It understands that without consensus and willingness, the 
assistance projects would likely fail. 
Finally, the Phare policy community involves equitable and positive-sum resource distributions.  
Because the Council and EP determine the Phare budget, political debates about the Phare program—
for example, whether Phare funding should be increased at the expense of other EU programs—are 
resolved outside the Phare policy community. Therefore, the only budgetary questions that are 
addressed inside the policy community concern country allocations which are equitable in the sense 
that the objective allocation criteria—population and GDP—strongly influence the funding levels.  
This procedure minimizes the occasion for lobbying and prevents inequitable distributions.  Phare 
grants are also positive-sum because they provide mutual benefits:  the EU benefits by strengthening 
the CEE demand for EU exports and preparing these countries for EU membership, while the CEE 
benefits by rebuilding its economy using the most advanced EU technology and know-how. Also, the 
Phare budget generally does not trigger disputes outside the policy community because Phare grants 
are relatively small.  In its first five years of operation, the Phare budget averaged less than ECU 1 
billion annually, which pales against the CAP annual budget average of nearly ECU 30 billion.  
Therefore, the Phare budget is not a high-profile target for EU lobbying groups, particularly in the 
agricultural sector since agricultural assistance comprised only 11.5 percent of Phare funding from 
1990 to 1993. 
Two other factors contribute to the closed structure of the Phare policy community.  First, the Phare 
program has operated under severe time constraints since its founding because CEE communism 
collapsed without advanced warning: 
 
These events took the European Community and its Member States totally by surprise, although this 
development had been one of their most important official foreign policy goals for decades.  However, 
none of them was really prepared, none had a blueprint for dealing with the new situation.[60] 
 
Phare thus scrambled to formulate a coherent, financially-stabilizing response to this crisis and acted 
under extreme time pressure to meet the EU’s 1990 budget deadlines.  Thus, Phare chose “a highly 
pragmatic course” in which it targeted the CEE’s most urgent needs—agriculture supply and credit 
programs, environmental protection, and human resources and training.[61] After this initial policy 
formulation, Phare continued to face stringent time constraints because it assisted a growing number of 
CEE recipients whose needs were unique.  These conditions required Phare to maintain a tight 
decision-making process which could follow local events closely and adapt the Phare budget 
accordingly. As a result, Phare achieved a respectable rate of resource allocation during its first four 
years. All its key funds were committed within the annual budget timetable, nearly half were 
contracted, and about three quarters were disbursed—a normal delivery rate for an assistance program 
concentrating on medium-term, technical assistance.[62] This relationship between time constraints 
and tight policy-making structure is consistent with a policy network analysis of the EU Esprit 
program where Peterson found that rapid technological changes permitted the Commission to operate 
more independently from the Member States: 
 
The Commission enjoys a level of autonomy in managing Esprit and other Framework initiatives 
which is unmatched in most other EC policy areas.  This is largely because the united strategy of the 
Big 12 firms in the mid-1980s convinced Member States that the EC’s technological decline required 
expedient, technocratic decision-making structures.[63] 
 
In that case, the exigencies of global technology competition required the EU to make policy choices 
quickly in order to prevent the EU falling further behind the Japanese and American competitors.  This 
analogy applies to the Phare program because if it had opened its programming cycle to a wider range 
of actors, such as EU agricultural interest groups, then Phare would likely have distributed its 
resources to the CEE recipients less effectively.  In agriculture, for example, inputs must reach the 
farmers by a certain date before losing their impact on the year’s harvest.  So, when CEE food 
production collapsed after 1989, Phare had little choice but to act quickly and autonomously. 
A second factor which added to the closed structure of the Phare policy community was the technical 
nature of its assistance, particularly in the agricultural sector.  This feature is also evident in the CAP 
policy community where few policy-makers understand the highly technical operation of price 
supports and variable levies.  In Phare, this complexity was compounded by the lack of EU expertise 
on CEE agriculture prior to the collapse of communism.  After 1990, Phare officials not only had to 
acquaint themselves with less familiar economic conditions, but they also had to contend with “a 
difficult and unstable environment with frequent changes in governments and basic policies as well as 
in the institutions and counterparts responsible for implementing the programs.”[64] As a result, the 
knowledge base on which Phare prepares its agricultural strategy has been limited to a small group of 
well-informed policy-makers who have maintained close contacts with their CEE counterparts. 
Overall, Phare has operated like an insulated think tank inside the Commission, devoting more 
attention to free trade ideology than protectionist politics.  The transition created a brief moment in 
which Phare could operate autonomously from EU institutions and lobbying groups and so construct 
an agricultural policy based mostly on the calculation of long-term benefits to the CEE economy.  This 
type of policy-making could not have occurred in an environment of routine bargaining between 
bureaucrats and interest groups.  This sense of policy-making independence is reflected in the 
Foreword to Phare’s agricultural strategy papers written by Alan Mayhew, the Director of Phare: 
 
[These papers] contain the thinking of those responsible for operating Phare on actions for the future 
and how Phare should contribute to the next phase of the transition.  The papers do not reflect any 
official position of the European Commission.  They have been written by the Phare Operational Units 
and are intended as a stimulus to discussion for all those involved in the debate on economic 
transformation in central and eastern Europe.[65] 
 
Phare has certainly succeeded in stimulating discussion about the CEE transition by its high level of 
activity inside the CEE and extensive interaction with the major IFIs and bilateral donors.  Yet, the 
negative consequence of Phare’s independent approach to policy-making has been its lack of 
coordination with the CAP—an oversight which allowed deep conflicts to emerge between EU aid and 
trade objectives. 
 
Trade Versus Aid 
 
EU agricultural policy toward the CEE has been hampered by contradictions in its aid and trade 
objectives.  On the one hand, Phare has strived to realize the export potential of CEE agriculture, and 
on the other hand, CAP trade barriers have obstructed the rising tide of CEE food exports.  Aid and 
trade policies have thus clashed—with Phare extending a carrot, and the CAP wielding a stick—
because of the gap between the Phare and CAP policy networks.  Each network has operated as a tight, 
closed policy community and prevented competing ideas from filtering into their policy-making 
processes, so Phare and the CAP have failed to merge.  Therefore, EU agricultural policy is comprised 
of two, distinct policies in which Phare represents the interests of CEE farmers, and the CAP 
represents the interests of EU farmers.  This division merits close examination because it highlights the 
relationship between network structure and policy outcome.  Specifically, it illustrates the capacity of 
two policy networks, Phare and the CAP, which are located in the same institution, the European 
Commission, to promote and defend policies that diametrically oppose one another. 
Trade is an essential component of the transition because the CEE has enormous export potential 
across a wide range of products, especially with its proximity to the EU market.  An export-growth 
strategy would yield three, long-term benefits.  First, it would enable the CEE to accumulate foreign 
capital to finance its domestic reforms and raise depressed living standards.  Second, it would link the 
CEE economy to the global market and compel CEE enterprises to realize their comparative advantage 
in response to accurate, market price signals.  Third, it would stimulate competition in the growing 
CEE private sector so that formerly state-owned enterprises could no longer monopolize production 
and marketing.  Moreover, an export-growth strategy seems sensible given that CEE export profiles 
were warped by membership in the CMEA, a trading bloc which arranged exchanges of heavily 
subsidized Soviet energy for CEE agricultural exports.  These terms of trade allowed CEE firms to 
thrive without paying world market prices for energy inputs, so inefficiencies became locked into their 
production methods;  these could now be eliminated by trading under highly competitive conditions.  
In addition, the Soviet-dominated CMEA restricted CEE trade with the EU because Moscow feared 
economic dependency on the West.  Therefore, actual CEE-EU trade fell short of potential levels 
predicted by a gravity model.[66] Romania, for example, fulfilled only 30 percent of its potential trade 
with the EU in 1985, while six CEE countries averaged only 18.9 percent of their potential exports and 
17.3 percent of their potential imports (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7:  Potential and Actual CEE-EU Trade, 1985 
($ billions)  
  Exports  (%) Imports  (%)  
  Actual Potntl Realzd Actual Potntl Realized 
  
Bulgaria  0.4 2.5 16.0  1.3 2.7 48.1 
Czechoslovakia 1.5 15.2 9.9 1.6 15.7 10.2 
East Germany  4.7 23.6 19.9 4.3 23.9 18.0 
Hungary  1.3 6.5 20.0 1.8 6.9 26.1 
Poland  2.5 12.7 19.7 2.1 13.9 15.1 
Romania 2.6 5.3 49.1 0.8 5.8 13.8 
Total  13.0 65.8 19.8 11.9 68.9 17.3 
 
Source: Hamilton, Carl B., and L. Alan Winters. “Opening Up International Trade with Eastern 
Europe”  Economic Policy  (April 1992)  p. 85. 
 
Because of these gaps between actual and potential trade, economists expected an explosion in CEE-
EU trade after 1990.  Hamilton and Winters, for example, estimate that opening up trade with the CEE 
and the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) would “introduce new supplies of goods and 
export market opportunities on a scale and speed unprecedented in modern history.”[67]  This massive 
increase would occur because the CEE and FSU account for 15 percent of world income, possess 
scientific education facilities that match Western standards, and will increase their competitiveness 
through the introduction of free market incentives and the transfer of Western technology. Altogether, 
Hamilton and Winters forecast that the CEE and FSU could raise their share of world merchandise 
trade from 7 to 18 percent over two to three decades, such that gains from trade would greatly 
outweigh gains from aid: 
 
Clearly, [CEE and FSU] trade with market economies currently falls dramatically short of its 
potential...Failure to realize the potential increase in trade could have serious implications... [because] 
sound international trade relations are likely to offer a far greater stimulus to the [CEE and FSU] than 
could any conceivable aid flow.[68] 
 
Yet, the CEE could not export to the EU market unless there occurred a corresponding decrease in EU 
trade barriers.  CEE-EU trade relations did not bear a long history, having develope along cautious, 
politically-sensitive lines.[69]  In June 1988, the Soviet Union allowed the CMEA and EU to sign 
General Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements which marked the first step toward trade 
liberalization.  Then, after the transition started, the EU introduced more radical, unilateral measures 
which quickly increased EU-CEE trade flows:  it abolished quantitative restrictions previously applied 
to state-trading countries and suspended some quantitative restrictions previously applied to third 
country imports;  it also extended its Generalized System of Preferences. Yet, the pace of reform 
quickened and the issue of EU enlargement also became a serious consideration.  Therefore, in 
December 1991, the EU signed “second generation” Interim Agreements with Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia;  Romania and Bulgaria signed about a year later. These agreements, later called 
Europe Agreements, replaced the obsolete General Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements and 
proclaimed a bold initiative—the gradual establishment of a free trade area over ten years.[70] The 
agreements abolished all quantitative restrictions on industrial imports, except textiles and coal, 
eliminated tariffs on more than half the EU’s imports, and scheduled the remaining tariffs on industrial 
imports to disappear over five years.  In order to minimize the shock to the CEE, the agreements 
awarded preferential treatment by which the CEE would lower their trade barriers asymmetrically over 
ten years.  These agreements also included a standstill clause to prohibit the introduction of new trade 
restrictions, and they provided for the national treatment of private firms and workers, liberalization of 
cross-border services, easing of payments and financial transfers, and approximation of competition 
rules.  The agreements even stretched beyond trade to initiate regular political consultation and cultural 
cooperation.  Given this broad scope of application, the EU emphasized that the Europe Agreements 
marked “the beginning of an entirely new era in bilateral relations” between the EU and CEE.[71] 
However, the agreements also included anti-dumping and safeguard clauses which either side could 
invoke to protect a vulnerable industry against unfair trading practices.  Critics charged that these 
measures reflected the EU’s inflated fear of CEE competition and might cause creeping protectionism:  
as the CEE expanded its exports, the EU might decide to protect sensitive markets, which then would 
encourage the CEE to retaliate with equally protectionist measures.  In that case, the EU would provide 
a poor role model to aspiring free market economies and embolden CEE conservative groups who 
prefer to delay the reform:  “[The EU’s] interventionist stance on international trade may legitimize 
resistance to change and market forces in the eyes of the emergent Eastern economies.”[72]  Therefore, 
many observers felt that it was incumbent upon the EU, as the CEE’s largest potential trading partner, 
to fulfill its special duty to promote free trade, but the immediate results of the Europe Agreements 
proved disappointing.  In 1991, EU imports from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria increased 24 percent to ECU 16.1 billion, while EU exports increased 46 percent to ECU 17.5 
billion. This EU trade surplus was the opposite intention of the Europe Agreements.  This situation was 
particularly grave considering that the CEE needed to sustain a trade equilibrium to avoid aggravating 
its debt predicament.  The Commission, though, found little cause for alarm since it explained that a 
five-fold increase in exports of transportation equipment to Poland had temporarily created this CEE 
trade deficit.[73] Yet, the EU trade surplus reached ECU 2.5 billion in 1992, and it forced the 
European Council in Copenhagen to liberalize further the Europe Agreements. 
This CEE trade deficit problem became particularly acute in the agricultural sector and generated 
acrimonious debate because the CEE possessed a comparative advantage in food production relative to 
the EU.  CEE agricultural products could already penetrate the Western markets with their reasonable 
quality standards and low prices, and anticipated improvements in production and sanitation would 
only increase their competitiveness. However, EU agricultural protectionism is a highly political and 
sensitive issue, so the Europe Agreements contained a special protocol for agriculture which scheduled 
reciprocal trade liberalization and maintained normal CAP trade barriers.  The EU then aggravated this 
situation by invoking the safeguard clauses.  In April 1993, for example, it banned imports of CEE 
livestock and dairy goods for a month after an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the former 
Yugoslavia. Although the EU eventually lightened its terms, this ban still soured EU-CEE trade 
relations.[74] In addition, processed foods from the EU flooded the CEE market and displaced 
burgeoning local production:  “In Sofia, there is more French cheese, Danish pork, Dutch tomato 
concentrate, and Greek pasta than there is of equivalent Bulgarian products.”[75]  The most serious 
problem, though, was the agricultural trade deficit.  From 1989 to 1992, the CEE agricultural trade 
surplus dropped from ECU 874 million to ECU 301 million, then turned negative in the first ten 
months of 1993 (see Table 8).  Phare extrapolated these figures through 1993 and found that EU 
exports had grown by 300 percent since 1989, while CEE exports grew by just 9 percent.  Although the 
CAP’s trade barriers did not account entirely for this deficit because CEE output also declined and 
many EU quotas went unfilled, this trend clearly did not complement the Phare program’s export 
promotion strategy and reflected poor CAP-Phare coordination. 
 
Table 8:  CEE-EU Trade, 1989-1992 
(ECU billions) 
    % Change 
   1989 1990 1991 1992 1989-1992 
Total Exports  12.1  12.9 16.1  18.9  56.4 
Total Imports  11.5  12.0 17.5  21.4  86.1 
Total Trade Balance 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.5 5.67 
 
Agricultural Exports  2.1 - - 2.3 9.5 
Agricultural Imports  1.2 - - 2.0 66.7 
Agric. Trade Balance 0.9 - - 0.3 66.7 
 
Source:  Phare, “Progress and Strategy Paper” p. 13. This data includes Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
 
Economic analyses of potential CEE-EU agricultural trade confirm the economic irrationality of EU 
trade policy.  Hamilton and Winters argue that if the EU completely liberalized its agricultural market, 
then highly competitive CEE exports would force EU farmers to face lower food prices and declining 
output (see Table 9). Yet, even if the EU did not liberalize its market, then increased CEE food output 
would deflate world prices and force the CAP to increase its price subsidies and export refunds. Either 
way, an increase in CEE agricultural output would place considerable strain on the EU agricultural 
sector and drive “another nail in the CAP’s coffin.”[76] 
 
Table 9:  Effects of CEE-EU Agricultural Free Trade[77] 
(%)    
 Farm Prices  Farm Output  Consumption  Net Exports 
CEE 
Wheat 41  47  2  450 
Dairy 16  26  0  370  
Beef 85  78  23  1,030  
Pork 32  54  13  570 
 
EU 
Wheat 26  21  11  100  
Dairy 10  5  6  100 
Beef 19  18  14  530  
Pork 17  17  17  450 
 
Source:  Hamilton and Winters, p. 93. 
 
Yet, Rollo and Smith argue that the EU could afford to liberalize its agricultural market and 
compensate EU farmers for any resulting loss of income.  Their approach is to calculate the welfare 
effects of trade on the whole society.  Rollo and Smith thus forecast that if the EU established 
agricultural free trade with the CEE, then EU consumers and taxpayers would gain, and EU farmers 
would lose (see Table 10).  On the whole, though, the EU would gain ECU 2 billion, so it could 
compensate EU farmers who lost income.  Meanwhile, the CEE would gain ECU 1.9 billion—roughly 
double the average funding it receives annually from Phare. 
 
Table 10:  Effects of Integrating CEE and EU Agriculture[78] 
(ECU millions annually)      
     White Red  
   Cereals Sugar Meat Meat Milk  Oilseeds Oils Total 
EU farmers lose  773  338  599  1,282  305  64  379  3,741 
EU consumers gain  557  259  612  1,250  291  186  817  3,972 
EU taxpayers gain  427  184  102  1,019 - 224  0  279  1,788 
 
Gain to EU  211 105 115 987 238 122 717 2,019 
Gain to CEE  476 34 58 1,040 217 0 61 1,887 
Total Gain  687 139 173 2,027 21 122 778 3,906 
 
Source:  Rollo, Jim, and Alasdair Smith.  “The Political Economy of Eastern European Trade with the 
European Community:  Why So Sensitive?”  Economic Policy  (April 1993)  p. 154. 
 
Rollo and Smith thus argue that EU agricultural protectionism results more from interest group 
pressure than a rational calculation of net welfare gains.  They acknowledge that certain Member 
States would suffer a net consumption loss—Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain—where agriculture 
accounts for a large share of employment and value-added production, but they also note that the 
shocks caused by agricultural trade liberalization with the CEE would prove no harsher than previous 
market adjustments. For example, they forecast that prices would fall 1 to 8 percent, which is less than 
the 14 percent decline in EU farmgate prices which occurred from 1985 to 1991.  They also forecast a 
decline in labor demand as production decreases, but EU agricultural employment declined by 3.8 
percent annually from 1970 to 1980, and by 3.3 percent annually from 1980 to 1990.  Their conclusion, 
then, is that the economic shocks caused by agricultural trade with the CEE fall within the range of 
normal adjustment, so the maintenance of trade barriers is economically irrational: 
 
No rational economic explanation for the EU’s sensitivity with respect to trade with Eastern Europe 
emerges.  There will, of course, be adjustment problems, but the Community has successfully absorbed 
the adjustment problems of Western European economic integration, and the scale of the adjustments 
required by liberalized trade with Eastern Europe seem quite manageable, even making no allowance 
for the growing Eastern European market for Western European products.[79] 
 
In sum, these economic analyses demonstrate that liberalizing CEE-EU agricultural provides a net 
welfare gain.  Therefore, Rollo and Smith argue that the use of trade barriers is partially attributable to 
regulatory capture by the EU agricultural lobbying groups.[80] This conclusion contributes to the point 
that policy network structure has an impact on policy outcome.  Because the CAP policy network 
includes COPA and the ministries of agriculture as its core actors, it tends to defend narrow, farm-
focused interests, and because the Phare policy network includes agricultural economists and major 
IFIs as its core actors, it tends to promote broad, macro-economic interests.  The problem, then, is that 
the CAP and Phare approaches, which clearly conflict, must ultimately converge around the issue of 
EU enlargement because agriculture represents a central concern in this process. 
 
EU Enlargement 
 
Agriculture is integrally connected to the issue of EU enlargement because this sector is vitally 
significant for both the EU and CEE.  Economically, agricultural output accounts for a substantial 
share of CEE income, and subsidies consume two-thirds of the EU budget;  politically, the rural vote 
has a strong voice in CEE elections, and farmers boast the most influential lobbying group in the EU.  
The significance of agriculture thus complicates the path to enlargement, particularly since the 
contradictions between EU aid and trade policies have caused the CEE to doubt the promise of the 
Europe Agreements.  In June 1994, for example, Poland decided to pursue closer economic ties with 
Russia because strict EU quotas and tariffs on Polish goods had created a growing trade deficit.[81] 
Only a month earlier, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski had voiced Poland’s growing 
resentment over the EU’s reluctance to liberalize its trade: 
 
The greatest threat to the policy of integration is protectionism.  This problem is still particularly 
important in agriculture.  In the Association Treaty, there is a lack of strategic vision of integration in 
this sector, a lack of will to create a common market in this area...Until protectionist resistance is 
overcome and a scenario for including Polish agriculture in the Community is created, the prospects of 
membership will be uncertain.[82] 
 
However, this statement does not identify the EU’s principal financial concern over enlargement—the 
CAP budget.  Enlargement will likely involve a trade-off:  either the EU extends CAP subsidies to the 
CEE, which will cause the CAP budget to rise enormously, or the EU reduces CAP subsidies, which 
will cause EU farm incomes to decline: 
 
Good, cheap food will be one of the easterners’ chief exports to the rest of the Union.  The Union must 
therefore accept drastic cuts in its present members’ farm production, or bust its budget by paying out 
even more in subsidies.  Until it faces up to this, its talk of eastward expansion is so much hot air.[83] 
 
Several economic models have been used to forecast the effects of integrating CEE agriculture into the 
CAP.[84] On the one hand, Brenton and Gros advise radically transforming the CAP because they 
predict that accession of the Visegrad—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic—will 
increase the CAP budget by 60 to 100 percent, although this figure is based on pre-MacSharry reform 
data and assumes that CEE agricultural production will attain Western levels.[85]  The problem, they 
note, is that the CEE produces in greatest quantity those commodities which receive the highest CAP 
subsidies—milk, beef, veal, cereals, sugar, sunflower and rapeseed.  The EU and CEE production 
patterns are thus competitive, not complementary, because the regions share geological and 
climatological similarities.  Also, the EU produces these commodities in excess, so the CAP would 
have to subsidize the export of the CEE’s additional output.  In fact, export restitutions are the 
principal cause of the CAP budget’s expected growth, accounting for over 70 percent of its projected 
rise.[86]  Therefore, Brenton and Gros recommend eliminating the CAP’s open-ended, price support 
mechanism and shifting to international pricing: 
 
The results presented in this paper show that it is radical reform of the CAP that is essential.  Any 
attempt to prolong the existing system will lead to enormous burdens on the budget and will be 
doomed to eventual failure.  The challenge facing the EC is to reduce and in the end remove export 
restitutions.[87] 
 
On the other hand, a paper by Nallet and van Stolk reaches the opposite conclusion in that CEE 
agriculture should adjust to the CAP, not vice versa.  Their study avoids the question of budgetary 
costs and and stresses the urgency of agricultural policy harmonization:  “...there must be an 
institutional system [in the CEE] capable of inspiring, administering, and monitoring a new and more 
extensive CAP.”[88]  Specifically, Nallet and van Stolk suggest that the EU educate CEE officials and 
farmers about the technical mechanisms of the CAP in order to close the knowledge gap and prevent 
unnecessary conflicts.  More generally, they recommend that the CEE adopt a CAP-like price support 
mechanism because the current system is incapable of stabilizing farmgate prices. This failure is 
indicated by the fact that food prices have sometimes fallen below hard-core production costs which 
causes the farmers to lose income.  Therefore, CEE agricultural production declined 30 percent from 
1988 to 1992, and Nallet and van Stolk believe that a continuation of this trend could endanger CEE 
stability and damage EU-CEE relations: 
 
We are convinced that the only effective way of improving the situation rapidly is to set up a system of 
price stabilization for agricultural commodities.  Although such a system cannot be put in place 
immediately and in full, the legal and institutional infrastructure for it must be set up.  Without delay, 
the EU must set itself the objective of helping each of the CEE—according to its level of 
development—to lay the foundations of an agricultural policy compatible with the reformed CAP.[89] 
 
Together, these papers indicate the serious economic challenges associated with the process of EU 
enlargement.  Just as importantly, though, they mirror the conflict that divides the CAP and Phare 
approaches to agricultural policy.  The CAP, like Nallet and van Stolk, assumes that the objective of 
agricultural policy is to defend the welfare of farmers, so it measures success in terms of farm income 
stability.  In contrast, Phare, like Brenton and Gros, assumes that its objective is to boost efficiency and 
competitiveness, so it measures success in terms of net societal gains. The problem is that the CAP and 
Phare policy networks have isolated these conflicting approaches and so contributed to major 
contradictions in EU agricultural policy toward the CEE. While Phare urged the CEE to dismantle their 
state subsidies and concentrate on structural policy, the CAP maintained its protectionist trade barriers 
and delivered the message that price policy is dominant.  The potential outcome, then, is incompatible 
EU and CEE agricultural systems—an ironic result given the heavy emphasis placed on convergence. 
 
  
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined EU agricultural policy toward the CEE from 1990 to 1994 and confirmed two 
hypotheses relating to the Phare program.  First, it has shown that Phare agricultural assistance was 
based on principles of free trade, not protectionism, so its conception of agricultural policy differs 
fundamentally from the CAP.  Phare’s objective has been to increase the CEE’s international 
competitiveness through structural adjustments to its agricultural sector.  Phare projects focused on 
emergency assistance, land reform, enterprise development, and rural credit, while its future 
orientations will include policy convergence, productivity enhancement, and export growth.  In 
accordance with free trade principles, Phare insists that CEE governments play a minimally 
interventionist role during the transition and allow market forces to guide the direction of agricultural 
progress. This approach differs sharply from the CAP, which aims to support farm incomes through 
price supports, import levies, and export refunds.  Since 1958, the CAP has utilized price policy almost 
to the exclusion of structural policy, and the Commission has become increasingly interventionist as 
guaranteed price levels have risen for a wider range of commodities.  Therefore, the CAP and Phare 
agricultural policies clearly project inverse trajectories in the relationship between government and 
agriculture. As a result, the CAP and Phare policies have contributed to a potentially significant 
conflict between the EU and CEE as they proceed toward the moment of EU enlargement. 
Yet, the extent to which Phare has influenced CEE agricultural policy is ambiguous.  It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to investigate each CEE country’s path of agricultural reform, but clearly the debate 
over the role of government continues to this day. On the one hand, some observers support the 
protectionist model and cite the successes of EU agriculture, particularly in terms of increased income 
stability, productivity, and food self-sufficiency.[90] They advise the CEE to use price supports as 
their principal interventionist measure.  Some CEE countries have chosen this route.  Czechoslovakia, 
for example, established in 1991 a Price Guarantee Fund with which the government intended to make 
unlimited purchases to support minimum prices for wheat, rye, milk, and livestock products.[91] On 
the other hand, some observers endorse the free trade model and highlight its contributions to rising 
efficiency and falling prices.  They criticize the high budgetary costs associated with an open-ended, 
across-the-board price support mechanism, estimating that if the CEE adopted a CAP-like structure, 
then national budgets would rise $2.5 to $4.5 billion.[92]  Instead, they recommend adopting structural 
policies which aim to eliminate cyclical price fluctuations, assist farmers operating under unfavorable 
natural conditions, and expand agricultural research and advisory services.[93] Poland and Hungary 
moved in this direction in 1990 when they eliminated producer and consumer subsidies and exposed 
their food prices to the global market. 
The implication is that Phare must compete with many other voices in advising the CEE transition, and 
there is no guarantee that CEE governments will heed the advice that it provides.  With economic 
conditions still volatile, the debate over the relationship between government and agriculture will 
likely continue:  “The future of agricultural subsidies is one of the most debated questions in Eastern 
European agricultural circles.”[94]  Yet, it is clear that Phare has exerted an important influence on 
CEE agriculture.  From 1990 to 1994, Phare was the largest regional grant donor, and it intends to 
remain active through 1997.  Overall, it has completed numerous projects of widespread sectoral 
impact and has undoubtedly altered the shape of CEE agriculture.  Most importantly, Phare will 
continue to champion the managerial, rather than interventionist, role for CEE governments in order to 
achieve its long-term objective of international competitiveness. 
This paper has also shown that policy network theory provides an effective tool for analyzing EU 
agricultural policy toward the CEE.  At the start of the transition, one would have expected the EU to 
advocate a protectionist scheme for CEE agriculture given the CAP’s long-term dominance in the EU.  
In 1990, the CAP policy network represented almost exclusively the interests of farm lobbies.  It had 
inherited this   
corporatist structure from the original six Member States which founded the CAP in 1958 as national 
interest groups relocated their lobbying efforts to the EU-level.  Once inside the CAP policy network, 
these groups forged close ties with the other core actors—the ministries of agriculture and DG-VI.  
This closed, tight policy network thus enabled the CAP to resist reform pressures from the 
international trade arena and EU budgetary crises.  The Financial Times colorfully describes the CAP’s 
remarkable resilience: 
 
It is one of the [EU’s] quainter superstitions that the Common Agricultural Policy has quasi-magical 
staying power. Squeezed by budgetary stringency, bombarded in transatlantic trade wars, riven with 
internal contradictions of all kinds, the policy cruises on regardless. Its power defenders—in the 
European Commission’s agricultural directorate and in Europe’s farm lobbies—speak as if its 
existence, and its virtues, were synonymous with those of the Union itself.[95] 
 
This CAP obstinance confirms an important observation of policy network theory that EU policy-
making tends toward inertia rather than reform.  Marsh and Rhodes reached four conclusions on this 
point:  first, policy networks tend to promote continuity and act as a force for policy inertia;  second, 
policy networks with a dominant economic or professional interest are the most resistant to policy 
innovation;  third, the degree of policy innovation is contingent upon the salience of the issue;  and 
fourth, policy networks tend to innovate incrementally.[96] Yet, Marsh and Rhodes also identified the 
link between policy network structure and policy innovation as a key research priority: 
 
It might be argued that most of the literature on policy networks has paid insufficient attention to the 
question of change;  certainly such a failing is not surprising given the emphasis on policy networks as 
a barrier to change.[97] 
 
This case-study provides one example of policy innovation as EU agricultural policy toward the CEE 
split between protectionism and free trade.  Neofunctionalism could not explain this policy divergence 
because the Phare program did not spill-over from an earlier EU policy;  on the contrary, it represented 
an ad hoc response to the unexpected collapse of CEE communism.  Therefore, the explanation for this 
division in EU agricultural policy is the gap which developed between the CAP and Phare policy 
networks.  Phare operates independently of the CAP for two reasons:  first, its agricultural policy is 
subsumed under the broad umbrella of foreign aid, so the PHOS resides in DG-I rather than DG-VI;  
and second, Phare agricultural policy does not directly effect the welfare of EU farmers, so the PHOS 
does not maintain links with agricultural interest groups.  Moreover, the other core actors in the Phare 
policy network are located outside the EU—the CEE recipients and major IFIs.  Therefore, the Phare 
policy network, which resembles a Rhodes model policy community, is less constrained by political 
constituencies than the CAP policy network, so free trade ideology has contributed to a radical shift in 
its policy outcome.  This finding highlights another observation of policy network theory: 
 
 “The legitimacy of networks is not political, but resides in the claims to superior expertise and/or to 
increased effectiveness of service provision.”[98] 
 
In this case, agricultural economists in Phare, the CEE, and the IFIs could claim this expertise, and 
although they may have initially lacked a clear, long-term vision for CEE agriculture, what mattered 
most were the free trade principles upon which they shaped five years of grant assistance. 
Yet, the future of the Phare policy network appears uncertain as the prospects for EU enlargement 
improve. The admission of the CEE into the EU will converge the CAP and Phare agricultural policies 
because the agricultural sector is economically and politically vital to both sides.  Therefore, the CAP 
policy network may overwhelm the Phare policy network because the former controls vastly more EU 
budgetary resources and represents the interests of EU farmers—still an influential lobby. As 
enlargement approaches, then, the two networks may cooperate in preparing CEE agriculture for 
incorporation into the CAP. Yet, regardless of the outcome, Phare will have already altered the terms 
of CEE admission through its agriculture   
assistance. Having based its strategy on free trade principles, Phare may ultimately undermine the 
CAP’s protectionist orientation by reviving CEE agriculture without the aid of government 
intervention. Phare could thus serve as a catalyst to future CAP reform by taking advantage of the CEE 
post-communist transition to exhibit the benefits of free trade agricultural policy.  If that occurs, then 
policy network theory will again offer insight into the idiosyncrasies of EU policy innovation. 
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